1985: Thatcher’s ego and the need to stop Sinn Fein

Posted by Jim on August 23, 2015

Over 500 files had been made available to historians in Belfast this
week as part of the declassification of government files dating from the
mid-1980s.

Some 150 files have been largely opened but with some material redacted
(partially censored), while 108 files have been “fully closed” for a
further 56 years (completely censored). The bulk of those files relate
to prison matters or what the British government termed “civil
disobedience” or security matters.

One key file opened in Belfast claimed Margaret Thatcher signed the
Anglo-Irish Agreement in part because she wanted to go down in history
as the person who solved both the problems of Ireland and Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe).

Robert Andrews, the most senior civil servant in the British
government’s Northern Ireland Office (NIO), wrote in 1985 of Thatcher’s
personal motivation in pressing ahead with the agreement.

In the memo, Andrews set out the background to the Anglo-Irish Agreement
as it was just weeks away from being signed.

It provides a uniquely candid contemporaneous view of the reasons why
Thatcher signed the agreement with Dublin which infuriated both
unionists and republicans.

Andrew said that in 1983, the British government concluded that the
IRA’s armed campaign and a deteriorating economic situation requiring
heavy spending “could not be allowed to continue” and that a “major
effort” should be made to resolve the problem. He added: “The Irish
government under Dr FitzGerald were worried about the alienation of the
minority in the North and the rise of Sinn Fein and were ready to
co-operate in seeking solutions.”

The detailed memo then turned to Mrs Thatcher’s close personal
involvement in the process, and the influence of the previous 26 County
Taoiseach, Charles Haughey.

“The Prime Minister is attracted by the idea of going down in history as
the person who solved both the Rhodesian and the Irish problems (an idea
suggested to her by Mr Haughey); but she does not want to be accused by
the unionists (with whom her sympathies instinctively lie) of a sell-out
to Dublin.”

He said British officials wanted an agreement “for its own sake” because
a failure to reach agreement would cause serious problems in their
relations with the USA “and lead to increased support for NORAID [the
Irish Northern Aid Committee]”.

However, he noted that Thatcher did not want to be accused of a
sell-out to Dublin by the unionists “with whom her sympathies
instinctively lie”. Ultimately, Andrew, who had Thatcher’s support,
said the 1985 deal had to be crafted to encourage nationalists to
support British political institutions and the Crown forces but without
alienating unionists or involving an “unworkable” degree of
“interference” by Dublin in the North’s affairs.

Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald “had a genuine desire to make an historic
contribution to resolving the Irish problem”, he said, but that unionist
hostility would be significant.

However, he went on: “On the other hand, the consequences of not
[underlined] having an agreement would be extremely serious.

“The main plank of our present policy would have collapsed and the
collapse would be a body blow for [Sinn Fein’s nationalist rivals, the
SDLP], who have placed all their faith in the Anglo-Irish talks.

“It would be a gift for Sinn Fein who would regard it as proof that
political means produce nothing and that violence is the only answer.

“Unionists on the other hand would be triumphal and in no mood for
concessions to the minority.”

Concluding that a deal had to be done, he said that “I believe we are
now too far committed to draw back”.

WARNING OVER IRISH

But just after the agreement was signed, British officials found
themselves quickly struggling with the new dispensation.

One note from the NIO claimed that using the Irish language in an
official capacity in the Six Counties could lead to “rabid” behaviour.

The NIO warned against “sentimentalising” the value of Irish language
and culture. One official complained: “The conventional pluralism of
Northern Ireland public policy will be shattered and we shall end up
with two rabidly British and rabidly Irish communities … I see no
reason to believe that there is any route to internal harmony which does
not involve wider, indeed post-national identities.”

NIO officials said the views of the Dublin government on the issue were
“reactionary”, meaning regressive.

“It is only the UK which is in a position to take a properly
comprehensive view and it really cannot do so if we sentimentalise about
the value of Irish language and culture.

“The reality – and a very good thing too – is that Ireland and Britain
are both sharers in mid-Atlantic society.

“It is always possible for the Robin Flowers (an English poet who
translated poetry from Irish) of this world to love romantic Ireland
dead and gone. But it would be disastrous if that spirit played any part
in UK public policy-making.”

‘FOREIGN LANGUAGE’

The files also contain a complaint by the prominent human rights
campaigner and prison chaplain Monsignor Raymond Murray that he had been
ordered to stop using Irish during a pastoral visit to Long Kesh Prison
in 1985.

On November 22 1985 – just a week after the signing of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement – the then Fr Murray complained to the then British Direct
Ruler Tom King about the incident.

When Fr Murray protested that he regarded the ban on Irish “as an
infringement of freedom of conscience and cultural rights”, he was
informed that the prison governor had instructed that his visit “must
not be conducted in a foreign language”.

The priest asked King to confirm whether visits in Irish were
permissible and, if so, to make this clear to the staff. “Otherwise”, he
added, “it leaves the situation open to accusations of pure bigotry
against Catholics.” The files do not record any direct response on the
issue.